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We study the effects of generic entry on prices and utilization using both event study models that exploit
the differential timing of generic entry across drug molecules and cast studies. Our analysis examines
drugs treating hypertension, high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, and depression using price and utilization
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We find that utilization of drug molecules starts
decreasing in the two years prior to generic entry and continues to decrease in the years following
generic entry, despite decreases in prices offered by generic versions of a drug. This decrease coincides
with the market entry and increased utilization of branded reformulations of a drug going off patent.
We show case study evidence that utilization patterns coincide with changes in marketing by branded
drug manufacturers. While the reformulations---often extended-release versions of the patent-expiring
drug---offer potential health benefits, the FDA does not require evidence that the reformulations are
improvements over the previous drug in order to grant a patent. Indeed, in a number of experiments
comparing the efficacies of the patent-expiring and reformulated drugs do not find statistical differences
in health outcomes calling into question the patent-extension policy.
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knittel@mit.eduOver the next few years, a number of blockbuster drugs face patent expirationt is estimated that by
2012, brands with more than $30 billion in sales will face new competition from generics. As more
brands face patent expiration, many manufacturers will face the dilemma of how to grow revenue
and minimize operational cutbacks as reliance on the new drug pipeline is unrealistic. One tactic
is to develop an extended release formulation of an existing brand. Whether you call it extended
release (ER, XR), long-acting (LA), or extra-long (XL), the modied formulation is intended to
simplify dosing, improve compliance and extend the life of the patent. (emphasis added)
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1 Introduction
Among policymakers, the prescription drug industry is often touted as being a major source of
ineciency of the US health care system. This is not surprising given that annual expenditures on
prescription drugs exceeded $234 billion in 2008, accounting for over 1.5 percent of US GDP (Lundy,
2010). The growth in expenditures has been dramatic; expenditures were less than $25 billion in
1970 (in 2008 dollars).2 These increases come despite increases in the share of prescriptions lled
with generic drugs. In 1984, only 19 percent of prescriptions were generics; this was 67 percent in
2007.3
The rise in generics is due in large part to the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 which considerably
lowered the xed costs associated with generic entry. Following this act, a branded drug often
faces a large amount of competition soon after patent expiration. We use the discontinuity in the
amount of competition to analyze how pricing and prescription behavior varies around generic entry.
Our empirical strategy uses utilization and price data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
advertising data from IMS Health, and a mix of case studies and event study models to estimate the
eects of generic entry on total and out-of-pocket prices; brand, generic, and total drug molecule
utilization; and the utilization of branded reformulations of a drug facing generic competition.4
1http://www.pharmaphorum.com/2011/03/18/battling-patent-expiration-by-building-brand-loyalty/
2See Schondelmeyer and Thomas (1990).
3The 1984 gure is taken from CBO (1998) and is the share of countable units, while the 2007 number is from
Hartman et al. (2009a) and is the share of prescriptions.
4Throughout the paper we refer to a drug, or molecule, drug molecule, or product interchangeably. By this, we are
referring to a distinct \molecular entity". For example, metformin and metformin extended release are two distinctive
molecules, with brand and generic versions.
1Our focus is on therapeutic classes that treat depression, hypertension, high cholesterol, and type
2 diabetes from 1996 and 2007.
We nd decreases in pharmacy and patient out-of-pocket prices for the molecule following
generic entry, and accompanying decreases in brand market shares. Two years after entry, total
prices of the generic version of a molecule are 5-10 percent below pre-entry prices, while patients'
out-of-pocket expenditures are 15 percent lower. However, we nd large decreases in overall use
after patent expiration that begin in the two years before generic entry and continue in the years
following. From two years prior to entry to two years after entry utilization falls, on average,
by almost 50 percent. We also nd that the decrease in overall utilization prior to generic entry
coincides with increased utilization of branded reformulations of molecules going o patent. We
nd similar patterns of utilization across dierent types of health plans.
What explains the decrease in both molecular prices and utilization? We show evidence from a
number of case studies suggesting that the link is advertising. Specically, we show that advertising
decreases substantially in the two years prior to generic competition, coinciding with increased
advertising for patented reformulations, typically extended-release versions of the original molecule.
Thus, advertising eectively shifts demand from the now cheaper original molecule to other, still-
patented, molecules.
The welfare consequences of this are ambiguous and hinge on the relative benets of extended-
release versions and the ineciency arising from advertising and market power. These issues are
cleanly summarized in our opening quote. While extended-release versions are likely to increase
patient compliance and tolerability of the medication, these potential benets need to be weighed
against the distortions from market power. It is also worth noting that the benets from extended-
release versions are not always clear. Regulatory approval for an extended-release version does
not require proof that the extended-release version is an improvement over the immediate-release
version. The medical literature has pointed to one potential downside of extended-release versions
is the increase the risks associated with missing a dose, leading some to question their value over
immediate-release versions.5 There are few studies comparing the ecacy of extended-release ver-
sions with their immediate-release counterpart, rather than a placebo. Those that do exist show
a mixture of potential benets (see, for example, Rudolph and Feiger (1999) and Swanson et al.
(2004)) and no statistically (or medically) signicant dierences (see, for example, Adler et al.
5See, for example, Perucca (2009).
2(2000), Dopfner et al. (2004), and Schwartz et al. (April 2006)). Furthermore, for some classes
of drugs such as painkillers, extended-release versions create a heightened risk of abuse because
a larger quantity of the drug is contained in one pill. Famous cases of abuse, for example issues
with Oxycontin|the extended-release version of OxyCodone, likely prompted the FDA to recently
require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for extended-release opioids.
We are not the rst to analyze how prices, quantities, and promotional activities are aected
by patent expiration in the pharmaceutical industry. The analyses of Caves et al. (1991), Berndt
et al. (2003), Huskamp et al. (2008), and Lakdawalla et al. (2007) are the most signicant for our
work.6 Berndt et al. (2003) examine drug prices, marketing, utilization, and over-the-counter to
prescription switches occurring before and after generic entry for anti-ulcer drugs going o patent
in the 1990s using wholesale price and sales data and retail scanner data. The authors nd small
increases in the branded manufacturers' prices after generic entry, decreases in branded marketing
as generic entry approaches, and that the overall utilization of the therapeutic class falls|due
in part to losing market share to over-the-counter products with the same active ingredients and
brands. Huskamp et al. (2008) nd that manufacturers release reformulations of anti-depressants
(SSRIs) well before generic entry, reallocating promotion expenditures from the original molecule
to the reformulation. This evidence suggests that manufacturers market reformulations as a means
of extending patent life.
Most similar to our work are Caves et al. (1991) and Lakdawalla et al. (2007). Caves et al.
(1991) examine 30 drugs losing patent expiration between 1976 and 1987 using rst dierence
models and wholesale price and sales data. The authors nd that branded prices increase in the
period following patent expiration before generic entry, but then decrease as generic competitors
enter the market. They also nd decreases in advertising and overall utilization immediately before
and after patent expiration. Lakdawalla et al. (2007) examine 101 molecules with expiring patents
between 1992 and 2002 and nd similar decreases in overall use and advertising prior to patent
expiration. Their focus is to estimate the benets from patent protection in terms of inecient
6Other related work focuses on price responses to patent expiration. There is some disagreement about branded
drug pricing following generic entry, but this research always nds large price decreases with time following generic
entry and the number of generic competitors. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) investigate 18 drugs rst facing generic
entry between 1984 and 1988 and nd that generic prices are initially lower than branded prices and continue to
decrease. Unlike Caves et al. (1991), they nd that branded prices increase at the same rate prior to and following
generic entry. Frank and Salkever (1997) investigate 32 drugs going o patent during the 1980s and nd that brand
prices increase by 1 percent and generic prices decrease by 5.6 to 7.2 percent per generic competitor. Reien and
Ward (2005) examine 31 drugs going o patent in the late 1980s and early 1990s and also nd that increases in the
number of generic competitors decreases generic prices. This literature reects the substantial decrease in price and
improvement in accessibility of drugs following patent expiration and generic entry.
3advertising. As such, they take a more structural approach estimating a 3SLS model of demand,
supply, and advertising. Because their focus is not necessarily on the dynamics of utilization
and prices in and around patent expiration, their empirical model allows for a limited number of
discrete changes in these relationships focusing on one and ve months after patent expiration. Our
approach is more descriptive in the sense that we want to understand the dynamics of utilization
and pricing of the molecule facing patent expiration, as well as other related molecules, both after
and leading up to generic entry.7
The market for pharmaceuticals and health insurance has changed considerably in the past 20
years. The sample in Caves et al. occurs almost entirely before the 1984 drug act, and generic
drug use in the late 1980s was considerably lower than it is today. Pharmaceutical marketing is
much more prevalent, as are cost-conscious health and drug insurance plans that discourage the
use of branded drugs. As the brand market share for a given drug molecule after generic entry is
very low, the choice between generic molecules or new patented products is increasingly signicant
for health care costs (Wallack et al., 2004). Our work makes three key contributions. First, we
examine a set of recent patent expirations for blockbuster drugs, focusing on changes in utilization
of branded reformulations. Second, we investigate whether utilization patterns vary with insurance
type. Finally, we examine marketing as a mechanism for changes in utilization. We extend the
analysis of Huskamp et al. (2008) both by considering molecules outside of anti-depressants and
investigating the correspondence of changes in utilization and marketing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the FDA drug approval process, pre-
scription benet design, and pharmaceutical marketing. Section 3 discusses our data and the
therapeutic classes on which we focus. Section 4 discusses our empirical approach. Section 5
discusses our results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In this section, we describe the changes that have occurred in the regulation of generic drugs,
prescription benet designs, and advertising in the pharmaceutical industry.
7While Caves et al. (1991) and Berndt et al. (2003) do not nd positive eects of price decreases following generic
entry on the overall quantity of a molecule utilized, in other contexts researchers have found that decreased drug prices
do lead to higher utilization. For example, Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010) nd that the enactment of Medicare
Part D in 2006 led to decreased prices for prescription drugs with high Medicare market shares, and that utilization
increased as a result.
42.1 Patent Policy
The treatment of generic drugs by the FDA and legislative bodies has varied considerably over the
past 60 years. Prior to 1962, the approval process for generic drugs was shorter relative to that for
new molecules (CBO, 1998). However, following the 1962 Kefauver Act, the FDA required that
generic drugs be subjected to an approval process nearly as rigorous as that for new drug molecules,
dissuading generic manufacturers from entering the market (Scherer, 2000). Additionally, following
World War II many states enacted laws that prohibited the generic substitution of brand name
drugs by pharmacists (Scherer, 2000). The net eect of these policies was that brand name drugs
faced little generic competition following patent expiration, and the generic market share of those
that did was signicantly lower. The Congressional Budget Oce reports that only 18 of 52 top
selling drugs (that were non-antibiotics approved after 1962) faced generic competition in 1980, and
that for drugs with generic equivalents, generics consisted only 12.7 percent of total prescriptions
sold in retail pharmacies (CBO, 1998).
Barriers to generic entry were lowered signicantly in the 1980s. State laws prohibiting generic
substitution were all abolished by the mid-1980s (Grabowski and Vernon, 1986). Additionally, the
Hatch-Waxman Act, passed in 1984, shortened the approval process for generic imitators of branded
pioneer drugs whose patent was expiring. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic imitators needed
only to show that the generic version of a drug molecule was equivalent biologically to the pioneer
molecule (Scherer, 2000). Branded manufacturers were also given longer exclusivity as part of the
act, in order to account for the large portion of the patents' life taken up by the FDA approval
process (Grabowski and Vernon, 1986). On net, the Hatch-Waxman Act substantially increased
the utilization of generic drugs. The CBO cites 1997 IMS America data showing that the generic
fraction of all tablets and capsules sold increased from 18.6 percent in 1984 to 42.6 percent in 1996
(CBO, 1998).
2.2 Prescription Drug Benet Designs
While the generic share of overall prescriptions has increased considerably since Hatch-Waxman,
total prescription drug expenditures have continued to rise. In nominal terms, total retail spending
on prescription drugs increased from $40.3 billion in 1990 to over $227.5 billion in 2007 (Hartman
et al., 2009b). Both private and public providers of health insurance have responded to increasing
5drug costs by implementing prescription drug benet designs incentivizing use of cheaper generic
drugs over more expensive brand name drugs.
Private insurers have incorporated tiered prescription benet plans that require higher copay-
ment for brand name drugs over generic drugs and mandatory substitution of generics. Such
strategies have been shown to reduce prescription costs (Joyce et al., 2002; Malkin et al., 2004).
While similar benet designs have been implemented across private plans, there is evidence that
the tiers are steeper in Health Maintenence Organizations (HMOs) than in traditional fee for ser-
vice plans (Wallack et al., 2007). Additionally, HMO plans have smaller physician networks that
exert more inuence over physician prescribing behavior via formularies and educational programs
(Wallack et al., 2004) and nancial incentives and penalties (Scherer, 2000).
Public health insurance plans have also sought to reduce prescription costs. Some state Medicaid
plans require prior authorization before lling certain prescriptions, mandate use of generic drugs,
and in some cases require documentation that generic drugs are ineective before covering brand-
name drugs; however, evidence is mixed on the extent to which such policies reduce brand name
drug use and reduce costs (Cunningham, 2005; Fischer et al., 2007). Many Medicare Part D
enrollees enroll in private plans that include multi-tiered copayment levels (Zhang et al., 2009).
The existing literature suggests that prescription benet design may inuence the use of generic
versions of original molecules and reformulations after generic entry. In an extension of our main
analysis, we estimate stratied regressions, dividing patients into Employer-HMO health insurance,
Employer non-HMO health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and uninsured categories.
2.3 Prescription Drug Advertising
Concurrent to increased eorts to reduce pharmaceutical spending, pharmaceutical advertising has
grown over the past two decades. Physician detailing and direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA)
are mainly performed by brand name companies and shift utilization away from generic drugs
towards branded treatments. Expenditures are substantial. In 2007, pharmaceutical companies
spent $10 billion on promotional activity (KFF, 2008). Companies direct advertising to both
physicians and consumers. Physician-directed advertising takes the form of either professional
journal advertising ($400 million) or sales representative \detailing" ($6.3 billion). Changes to and
the clarifying of direct-to-consumer advertising rules has lead to an increase in direct-to-consumer
6advertising, topping $3.7 billion in 2007. Growth in advertising has also been substantial, especially
in direct-to-consumer advertising. Palumbo and Mullins (2002) report that DTC advertising was
a mere $12 million in 1989.
There is substantial evidence that advertising aects prescription drug utilization. Rosenthal
et al. (2003) and Iizuka (2004) nd that the main eect of direct-to-consumer advertising is to
increase the overall market of a class of drug, rather than expand the market share of the in-
dividual drug that is advertised. Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas (2008) nd similar market increases
for anti-depressants, but that this happens through more patients using anti-depressants, rather
than changes in anti-depressant utilization among users. Iizuka and Jin (2005) nd that direct-to-
consumer advertising increases doctor visits and that physician detailing inuences what drug a
doctor will prescribe. In summary, the existing literature suggests that pharmaceutical advertis-
ing, and physician detailing in particular, may have important eects on drug utilization patterns
around pharmaceutical patent expiration and generic entry.
3 Data
Our analysis uses price and quantity measures derived from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
generic entry dates from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and promotion data from IMS
Health. This section describes the construction of analytic data and the therapeutic classes included
in the analysis.
3.1 Generic entry dates
Generic entry dates come from the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research's Drugs@FDA
electronic database, which provides approval information for all branded drugs and their therapeutic
equivalents.8 These dates are provided, with the list of molecules in our sample, in Appendix Table
1.
8http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/
73.2 Prices, utilization, and controls
We construct price and utilization measures and controls from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS). We describe this process in greater detail in Appendix A. Our analysis uses MEPS
data from 1996 through 2007, comprising of 12 overlapping two-year interview panels (with only one
year for the last panel). Each panel contains a nationally representative sample of approximately 16
thousand individuals who are interviewed over ve interview rounds across the two years. We create
biannual observations for each individual, and then take means within a product and six-month
period (using MEPS person weights) such that the unit of analysis is product (or \molecule") by
six-month period.
We construct six price measures. The rst is the average total unit price for the branded version
of a drug (by \total", we mean the amount paid to pharmacies across all payers). The second is the
average total unit price across generic and branded versions of a drug (weighted by use). Finally,
we construct a \lower bound" total unit price, dened as the average branded price prior to generic
entry and the average generic price following. We also calculate \out-of-pocket" versions of each
price measure. We convert the nominal unit prices to real prices using year 2000 dollars and then
take the natural log. Average out-of-pocket prices are zero for some observations; thus, for all price
outcomes, we add one before taking the natural log.
The main utilization measures indicate whether an individual was prescribed a drug molecule in
a given six-month period, with separate variables for the branded version, generic version, or either
version. In addition, we construct an indicator variable for whether an individual was prescribed a
branded reformulation of each molecule. Utilization measures are then normalized by the fraction of
the population using a molecule in the six months prior to generic entry in order to be comparable
across molecules. 9
We create variables from the MEPS indicating whether individuals hold private HMO health
plans, employer provided health insurance that is not from a HMO, Medicaid, Medicare, or are
uninsured. Finally, we also compute demographic and health insurance characteristics of individuals
obtaining each drug in each period. These controls include the fractions of users who are black
non-Hispanic, Hispanic, aged 20 through 39, aged 40 through 59, and aged 60 or over.
9We do not take logs because of zeros.
83.3 Measures of promotion
Advertising measures are derived from IMS Health Promotion Audits from January 1999 through
December 2008. We construct: (1) product-specic quarterly costs of detailing, where detailing
includes a discussion with a provider, a brief mention of the product, a drug fair, an educational
presentation, a service visit, a telephone call, or other similar promotion, (2) product-specic costs
for advertising in medical journals in each quarter, (3) the number of free samples in each quarter,
and (4) total quarterly promotion costs (including all direct-to-consumer advertising, detailing, free
samples, and other promotion).
3.4 Therapeutic Classes
Our sample includes prescription drugs in therapeutic classes treating depression, hypertension,
high cholesterol, and type 2 diabetes. We chose prevalent chronic diseases that are (to varying
degrees) controlled by long-term drug use. Our sample includes drugs in classes that are the most
common rst-line treatments for these diseases and are among the most prescribed of all drugs,
with the highest expenditures. The specic drugs in our sample are displayed in Appendix Table
1.
Diabetes is a mounting public health concern. 25.8 million people- 8.3 percent of the U.S.
population- had diabetes in 2010, with 1.9 million newly diagnosed adult (older than 19) cases
(CDC, 2011). Poor control of diabetes can lead to or exacerbate other medical conditions including
heart disease, stroke, and hypertension. In addition, diabetes is the leading cause of kidney failure,
nontraumatic lower-limb amputations, and new cases of blindness among adults in the United
States (CDC 2011). We investigate two rst-line type 2 diabetes oral medication classes, used
when diet and exercise are not sucient to control blood glucose: biguanides and sulfonylureas.
Sulfonylureas help stimulate insulin production in the pancreas, and thereby lower blood glucose,
while Biguanides, a drug class primarily including metformin, increases sensitivity to blood glucose
(Barnett and Braunstein, 2004). The rst sulfonylurea received FDA approval in the mid-1980s
and went o patent in the 1990s. Metformin received FDA approval in 1996 and went o patent in
2001. We will consider each class individually and drugs that are combinations of the two classes.
These two classes of drugs, and metformin in particular, are among the most prescribed in the
country. Over 4.5 million people in the US lled a metformin prescription in 2000, increasing to
97.5 million people in 2006, putting metformin among the top ten drugs prescribed in each year.10
Hypertension, or high blood pressure, aicts 31 percent of adults in the United States (CDC,
2010). Hypertension can cause or exacerbate coronary artery disease, stroke, heart failure, and renal
disease (Awtry and Loscalzo, 2004). We focus on two common rst- or second-line therapeutic
classes for lowering blood pressure: ACE inhibitors and Angiotensin receptor blockers (ARB).
These two classes are very similar in mechanism and eect (Fischer et al., 2007). However, ACE
inhibitors lost patent protection starting in the mid-1990s, while ARBs are still under patent.11
ACE inhibitors are among the top drugs prescribed in the US. Lisinopril, a popular ACE inhibitor,
was prescribed to over 11 million people in 2006.12
High blood cholesterol aects 16 percent of adults in the United States and is associated with a
higher risk of heart disease (CDC, 2009). Statins form the primary pharmaceutical treatment for
lowering LDL blood cholesterol and can help reduce deaths from heart disease.13 The rst statin,
lovastatin, received FDA approval in 1987, and went o patent in 2001. However, numerous statins
still have patent protection. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) was the third most prescribed drug in 2000, with
over 7 million people in the US receiving prescriptions.14 By 2006, this number increased to almost
14 million people in the US in 2006, making Lipitor the most prescribed drug in the United States.
Simvastatin and Vytorin were also in the top 25 drugs in terms of total expenditures throughout
the last decade, with millions of Americans receiving prescriptions.15
Depression aects 20 million people in the United States.16 We examine drugs in three com-
mon rst-line therapeutic classes treating depression and anxiety: selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), and norepinephrine
and dopamine reuptake inhibitors (NDRIs). Early antidepressants, uoxetine (Prozac) and bupro-
pion (Wellbutrin) obtained FDA approval in 1987 and 1985 respectively. Generics for these classes
became available in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These molecules are also among the most
prescribed drugs with the highest overall expenditures. Fluoxetine (Prozac) was prescribed to
over 3 million people in 2000, with expenditures of almost 2 billion dollars. In 2006, escitalopram
10http://meps.ahrq.gov/






10(Lexapro) was prescribed to over 4.5 million people with total expenditures of almost 2 billion
dollars, and sertraline (Zoloft) was prescribed to 4.3 million people with total expenditures of over
2 billion dollars.17
4 Empirical Methodology
Our empirical approach combines event study regressions and descriptive case studies. The event
studies seek to identify how prices and utilization of both the \at-risk" molecule and patented
reformulations change in response to, or expectation of, generic entry. Having established these
empirical results, we next analyze how promotional activity corresponds with changes in prices and
utilization around the time of generic entry using case studies.
The main sample for the event study analysis includes 35 drugs treating type 2 diabetes, hyper-
tension, anxiety and depression, or high cholesterol that lose patent protection between 1996 and
2007 (listed in Appendix Table 1). Price outcomes are from the MEPS and include the average
total price of the branded version of a drug, the average total price across branded and generic
versions, a \lower-bound" total price that is the average branded price prior to generic entry and
the average generic price after entry, as well as patient \out-of-pocket" versions of each measure.
Utilization outcomes also come from the MEPS and include the probability of receiving the branded
version of a drug, the probability of receiving the generic version, the probability of the branded
or generic version, and the probability of a branded reformulation.
On the patient side, generic entry may represent a shift in accessibility as a drug molecule
becomes less expensive with generic entry. For example, a drug molecule may move to a lower
copayment tier or be added to a drug plan formulary. While this shift may not be completely
unanticipated, we argue that this decrease in price can be considered exogenous from the patient's
perspective. On the manufacturer's side, however, generic entry is hardly an unanticipated event.
As discussed in the introduction, drug manufacturers respond to imminent generic entry by chang-
ing prices and marketing of branded drugs; thus, the impacts of generic entry come prior to the
actual event. As such, simple pre-post comparisons are inadequate. Instead, we use event study
models that exibly trace changes in pricing and utilization over the life-cycle of the drug. This em-
pirical strategy disentangles life-cycle eects from aggregate demand (or time) eects by exploiting
17http://meps.ahrq.gov/
11the dierential timing of generic entry, as in (1):




mt + Xmt + mt; (1)
where ymt is the average price or utilization of molecule m at time t (where t represents a six-
month period),  is a constant, t are time xed eects capturing general changes in prescription
drug activity, m are molecule xed eects to control for time-invariant characteristics of molecule
m (e.g., variation in the baseline probabilities of being prescribed a particular molecule), mt are
linear molecule time trends, and Xmt are time-varying characteristics of patients being prescribed
molecule m at time t. The variables POST 10 through POST5 are indicator variables for 10 or
more biannual periods prior to expansion through 5 or more biannual periods following entry, with
the indicator POST 1 omitted as the comparison period 18. The associated  coecient estimates
trace changes in outcomes prior to and following generic entry. In the reformulation analysis, ymt
is dened as the fraction of the population using a reformulation, but POST is dened as the date
when the original formulation faced generic competition. We calculate standard errors clustering
on therapeutic class - six-month cells.
We specify the number of pre- and post-periods such that each parameter estimate is identied
by the majority of the drugs facing generic competition. As many of the drugs in these therapeutic
classes lost patent protection later in the sample period, there are more pre-periods than post-
periods. We use the estimated fraction of the population using each molecule in the six months
prior to generic entry as regression weights for each drug. Thus, our estimates show the average
eect of generic entry on individuals using these classes of prescription drugs, rather than the
average eect across drugs.
We estimate regressions stratifying by health insurance type to determine whether patterns of
use vary with the structure of prescription drug coverage. We also estimate event studies stratifying
by age. We test the robustness of our results by estimating separate event studies that (1) omit
molecule specic time trends, (2) include therapeutic class by time xed eects, (3) restrict the
event study to a balanced panel, and (4) omit regression weights.
18We only examine ve pre-generic entry biannual periods for the price analysis
125 Results
5.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 displays summary statistics. The rst column displays the mean characteristics of the
person-biannual MEPS observations between 1996 and 2007, computed using MEPS sample weights.
The second, third, and fourth columns show summary statistics for individuals using branded,
generic, or any version of the drugs in our sample. These statistics show that 15.9 percent of the
US population used the drugs in the sample over the sample period, illustrating the policy rele-
vance of these therapeutic classes. Patients using the drugs in the sample are primarily covered by
Medicare or private insurance. Most of the individuals with prescriptions in our data are older than
40; this is unsurprising, as the prevalences of type 2 diabetes, high cholesterol, and hypertension
increase with age.
5.2 Price Event Study Results
Our rst event studies display price trends in the years before and after generic entry. We estimate
separate regressions for branded prices, the average price across branded and generic versions
purchased, and a lower-bound price dened as the average branded price prior to generic entry,
and the average generic price post-entry. We estimate equation (1), where the unit of observation
is a molecule and six-month period. Prices are expressed in log-real terms. To account for zeros
in out-of-pocket prices, we add one prior to taking natural logs. We regress price outcomes on
pre- and post-generic entry indicator variables, biannual xed eects, drug molecule xed eects,
characteristics of individuals using each molecule including race and ethnicity (fractions black
non-Hispanic and Hispanic), health insurance status (fractions with Medicare, Medicaid, employer-
provided HMO, and employer-provided non-HMO), age (fraction under 40, fraction 40 to 60, and
fraction 60+), and molecule-specic time trends in the main specications. Our sample includes the
35 molecules in the therapeutic classes of interest facing generic competition between 1996-2007.
All estimates are weighted using the fraction of the population prescribed the molecule in the period
prior to generic entry, and standard errors are clustered at the therapeutic class-biannual level.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically display regression estimates. In each gure, coecient estimates are
displayed as a solid line, and the dashed lines represent the 95 percent condence interval for the
13coecient estimates. The year prior to generic entry is omitted as the comparison period. Figures
1a and b show estimates for total prices of branded drugs, with and without molecule specic time
trends. These estimates show little change in branded prices in the years prior to generic entry, and
statistically insignicant increases after generic entry. Figures 1c and d show estimated changes in
average prices before and after generic entry, of varying statistical signicance. However, Figures 1e
and f trace out changes in \lower bound" prices around generic entry|dened as average branded
prices prior to generic entry and average generic prices following generic entry{ and show price
decreases in the two years following generic entry that range from 10 to 15 percent. Figure 2
shows similar estimates for out-of-pocket prices. Figures 2e and f, most notably, show statistically
signicant decreases in generic out-of-pocket expenditures of 10 to 15 percent relative to pre-generic
entry branded prices.
In sum, these estimates imply little change in branded prices leading up to generic entry and
increased accessibility of drug molecules, with respect to price, after generic entry.
5.3 Utilization Event Study Results
Figure 3 displays pre- and post-generic entry trends in generic, branded, and overall drug molecule
utilization. Utilization outcomes are constructed as the fraction of the US population using a
molecule in each six-month period and are normalized by utilization in the six months prior to
generic entry. In each case, the solid line indicates coecient estimates and the dashed lines are
95 percent condence intervals, with time since generic entry on the x-axis and the period prior
to generic entry omitted as the comparison period. The coecient estimates can be interpreted
as changes in utilization as a fraction of overall utilization in the six months before generic entry
(after accounting for xed eects, molecule-specic linear time trends, and other controls). Figure
3a shows that generic use increases to 40 percent of pre-entry branded use two years after entry.
Figure 3b shows that branded use begins decreasing in the two years prior to generic entry and
decreases an additional 64 percent after two years of generic competition. In Figure 3c, total
molecule use after generic entry|combining branded and generic drug use|decreases 20 percent
in the two years after generic entry, and over 40 percent from two years prior to generic entry.
This nding is surprising in light of evidence in Figures 1 and 2 that prices fall after generic entry.
Assuming that branded and generic versions of a given molecule are equivalent, simple economic
intuition predicts that total use would increase with the entry of cheaper generics, all else equal.
14Figure 4 exhibits reformulation event studies for 13 drugs in our sample that face generic entry
and for which alternative formulations exist. These drugs, and their alternative formulations,
are listed in Appendix Table 2. We dene alternative formulations to include extended release
versions of drugs and \combination" reformulations of original molecules with other drugs. The
reformulation utilization measure is dened as the fraction of the population using a reformulation,
divided by use of the original formulation in the six months prior to generic entry. The fractions
of the population using the original formulation in the six months prior to generic entry are used
as regression weights. Figure 4a exhibits pre- and post-generic entry trends in original branded
formulation use for the \reformulation sample". As in the full sample case, the probability of
obtaining the branded molecule begins falling in the two years before generic entry. Figure 4b
shows estimates from the reformulation event study, implying substantial growth in reformulation
use in the years immediately prior to generic entry for the original formulation. Following entry,
further increases are statistically insignicant, possibly because in some cases, the reformulations
themselves lose patent protection. These estimates suggest that decreasing overall use of a molecule
around generic entry may originate from patients shifting to branded reformulations.
5.4 Utilization Event Study Extensions
In Figures 5 and 6, we estimate separate event studies for patients with varying health insurance
status. Figure 5 displays utilization event study results for patients with employer-provided HMO
plans, employer provided non-HMO plans, Medicare, Medicaid, and no insurance. To the degree
that HMOs and Medicaid may restrict access to newer branded drugs more than non-HMO employer
provided plans, we expect smaller decreases in utilization for these groups prior to generic entry.
However, Figures 5a-d show that patterns of total use are generally similar across all sources of
insurance. Figure 6 displays estimates of reformulation use around generic entry stratied by
health insurance type. Again, we predict that private non-HMO patients may exhibit greater use
of branded reformulations than private HMO patients, Medicaid, or uninsured patients who have
greater access to generics than newer branded drugs. However, the estimates are comparable across
health insurance categories, with HMO patients exhibiting higher use of reformulations after generic
entry.
The lack of dierential eect across health insurance types suggests that these patterns of
utilization exist in spite of benet designs promoting use of generics to varying degrees. However,
15there are a couple caveats to this nding. First, we are not comparing patients across dierent
benet designs persay, but rather across reported type of health insurance. Second, health insurance
status is not randomly assigned, so there may be selection processes by which patients selecting
into HMOs, for example, have a higher propensity to shift to reformulations based on unobserved
characteristics. As such, we interpret these ndings as suggestive rather than conclusive.
In Figure 7, we examine whether patterns of drug use vary across younger and older patients.
The estimates are less precise for younger patients, as older individuals are more likely to require
medication to control hypertension, high cholesterol, and type 2 diabetes. Total use of original
formulations falls at a similar rate prior to generic entry for younger (0-40 years old) and older
(40-80 years old) patients.
Finally, we test the robustness of our main results to alternative specications. Figure 8 dis-
plays results of alternative specications for total use of original formulations. Figure 8a displays
estimates not including molecule-specic trends, and shows more stable use prior to generic entry.
More notable, however, is that the reduction in use is only marginally signicant after up to one
and a half years following entry and is then insignicant after this period. As will become evident
with the case studies, controlling for molecule time trends is important as dierential pre-generic
entry trends appear to exist across molecules.
In Figure 8b, we include therapeutic-class-specic time eects. The comparison group in our
main sample is dened as all other drug molecules not going o patent in the same period. This
implicitly assumes that the utilization of other drugs is unaected when one product faces generic
competition. This assumption is implausible, especially within similar therapeutic classes treating
the same condition. In fact, our results suggest that utilization of other branded drugs increases
when a drug faces generic competition. By including class-time xed eects, we control for class-
level changes in utilization, and thus the coecient estimates are identied by changes in molecule
use relative to other drugs in the sample from the same therapeutic class. The estimated eects
of generic entry are larger, suggesting that utilization decreases relative to other drugs in the
therapeutic class. Figure 8c restricts the sample to a \balanced panel", such that each molecule is
present for 10 periods prior and 5 periods following generic entry, and nds similar results.19
In the main specications, we use the fraction of the population using each drug molecule in
the six months prior to generic entry as regression weights. In Figure 8d, we estimate the main
19The drugs in this balanced panel sample are listed in Appendix Table 1.
16specications without weights, in order to detect whether a few heavily prescribed molecules are
driving the results. Our estimates become less precise, but the magnitudes and overall pattern
remains similar.
We are perform similar specication checks for the reformulation regressions in Figure 9. Omit-
ting molecule specic trends (in Figure 9a) has little eect on estimated patterns of use; however,
the standard errors become much larger. Allowing separate time xed-eects for depression drugs
relative to other classes (combining hypertension, cholesterol, and diabetes drugs) in Figure 9b
does not substantively change our estimates, but leads to larger standard errors. Finally, we use
the fraction of the population using the original formulation in the six months prior to generic
entry as regression weights in our main specication. These weights vary considerably, from over
1 percent for metformin to only one-tenth of 1 percent for other molecules. Figure 9c shows that
our estimates are extremely sensitive to including these weights, and that the main estimates are
driven primarily by the more heavily used molecules.
5.5 Case studies
The event studies show that despite the decrease in price after generic entry, total use of an
original formulation falls. We also nd that use of branded reformulations increases, suggesting
that patients shift from original formulations to newer branded reformulations. In this section, we
examine specic case studies, and provide suggestive evidence on the role played by marketing.
The rst case study is for metformin, a blockbuster medication for type 2 diabetes. Figure
10a shows prices of metformin increasing in real terms throughout the late 1990s and in 2000,
and then leveling o in the two years prior to generic entry, after which generic prices fall in real
terms. 20However, Figure 10b shows use of branded meformin increasing until 2000, and then
falling in the two years prior to generic entry, seemingly unrelated to price. In Figure 10c, the
entry and increased use of branded reformulations of metformin coincides with the decreased use
of the branded original formulation prior to generic entry. Figures 10d and e show that these
eects are likely driven by marketing; detailing costs and free samples for brand name metformin
(Glucophage) and brand name metformin extended-release (Glucophage XR) mirror changes in
20There is a large drop in price in 2007. We are able to match our total expenditure estimates with those from
AHRQ for few molecules, so we believe this to be real. We hypothesize this is due to increased availability of generics
through retail stores such as Wal-Mart, which began selling discounted generic drugs in 2006
17utilization of these products. Finally, medical journal advertising for Glucophage XR spikes prior
to generic entry for extended release metformin in 2003.
Figure 11 shows prices and use of simvastatin (brand name Zocor), a popular medication used for
lowering high cholesterol. Simvastatin received FDA approval in 1991 and faced generic competition
starting in June 2006. Figure 11a shows little change in branded prices prior to generic entry and
large decreases in the price of generic simvastatin after generic entry. Figure 11b shows decreased
use of branded simvastatin in the two years prior to generic entry, and Figure 11c shows that this
corresponded with increased use of Vytorin, a patented combination of simvastatin with ezetimibe
(another cholesterol drug) also manufactured by Merck. Figures 11d and e exhibit large increases
in detailing and samples of Vytorin corresponding with decreased simvastatin and increased sim-
vastatin+ezetimbe use. In addition, Figure 11f shows a spike in medical journal advertising for
Vytorin corresponding with changes in Zocor and Vytorin use.
Figure 12 displays prices and use of bupropion sustained release (SR). Bupropion SR (marketed
as Wellbutrin SR) received FDA approval in 1999 and was the second of three Wellbutrin products
released on the market. Prior to Wellbutrin SR facing generic competition in 2003, Wellbutrin XL
(taken once daily) was released with exclusivity through 2008.21 Figure 12a shows average total
\lower bound" unit prices for bupropion SR over the sample period. Branded prices for bupropion
SR increased prior to generic entry. Generic prices oscillate after generic entry but were generally
equivalent or lower in real terms (except for 2005). Despite relatively stable prices, total use of
bupropion SR falls substantially after generic entry (in Figure 12c). Figure 12d shows that the
decreased use of branded bupropion SR corresponded with the entry and increased use of branded
bupropion XL (Wellbutrin XL). Furthermore, in Figure 12d and e, this occurred simultaneously
with decreased advertising and samples for branded bupropion SR and increased advertising samples
for bupropion XL. In addition, Figure 12f shows a sharp and transitory increase in medical journal
advertising for Wellbutrin XL, immediately following generic entry for Wellbutrin SR.
Finally, Figure 13 displays prices and use of another popular SSRI, citalopram. Citalopram
received FDA approval in 1998 and was marketed by Forest Labs under the brand name Celexa.
Figures 13a show stable prices (in 2000 dollars) for citalopram in the years prior to generic entry
and following generic entry (until 2007). Figure 13b shows citalopram use steadily increasing from
release in 1999 until 2002 when nearly one percent of the population obtained Celexa. Between
21The original bupropion was administered three times daily, Bupropion SR two times daily, and bupropion XL
one time daily.
182002 and 2004, however, citalopram use fell almost 50 percent. Simultaneously, the FDA approved
another SSRI marked by Forest Labs, escitalopram (brand name Lexapro). Escitalopram is the
enantiomer, or molecular mirror image, of citalopram. Figure 13c shows the utilization of branded
citalopram and branded escitalopram. The rapid take-up of escitalopram coincides almost exactly
with the decrease in the use of citalopram, suggesting that patients and physicians were persuaded to
shift from citalopram to escitalopram. Figures 13d-f support this hypothesis; patterns in detailing,
samples, and total promotion (including physician detailing, professional promotion, and direct-to-
consumer advertising) for Celexa and Lexapro coincide with changes in use.
These case studies conrm that use of medications falls in the years immediately before and
after generic entry, and that this happens even when prices fall or are stable in real terms. How-
ever, we also nd that this decreased use coincides with branded drug manufacturers unveiling new
formulations of molecules facing generic entry. Examining advertising data, it appears that manu-
factures also shift marketing eorts to the new formulations. This behavior eectively extends the
exclusivity of the original molecule and appears to reduce use of generics.
6 Conclusions
We use case studies, event study models, and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to
estimate the eects of generic entry on prices and utilization of blockbuster drugs treating hyper-
tension, high cholesterol, depression, and type 2 diabetes. We examine how generic entry eects
dier across individuals with dierent sources of health insurance. We nd that generic prices fall
relative to branded prices, and that branded company market share falls rapidly after the entry of
generic competition. However, we also see that the utilization of the branded molecule begins to fall
prior to generic entry, and that this coincides with increased utilization of branded reformulations.
We nd suggestive evidence that these patterns exist across individuals with dierent sources of
health insurance. Finally, case study evidence implies that marketing to physicians and patients
drives these patterns of use.
The purpose of pharmaceutical patent policy is to optimally incentivize and reward drug man-
ufacturers for innovation, while protecting society from excessive deadweight loss coming from
monopoly pricing. We show evidence that rather than society enjoying the consumer surplus from
competitive pricing after generic entry, utilization is shifted towards other still-patented drugs.
19We remain agnostic on the extra benet from the reformulations and newer drugs (even patented
reformulations that are combinations of two drugs that are both available generically could im-
prove patient compliance). Comparative eectiveness analysis is necessary on a case-by-case basis
to make such determinations. However, to the degree that some new and patented drugs oer
little improvement in health outcomes relative to the generic drugs (and at considerable expense),
current pharmaceutical patent policy may both discourage true innovation and prolong monopoly
rents by granting exclusivity to products very similar to those losing patent exclusivity. As policy-
makers currently seek to control health care costs, expanding polices promoting use of generic
pharmaceuticals may be fertile ground for achieving savings.
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent condence intervals.
Standard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates
generic entry.
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent condence intervals.
Standard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates
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27Figure 3: Generic entry utilization event studies
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent condence intervals.
Standard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates
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28Figure 4: Branded alternative formulations of drug molecules facing generic entrants
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent con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29Figure 5: Total molecule use by health insurance type
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent condence intervals.
Standard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates
generic entry.
30Figure 6: Use of reformulations by health insurance type
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent con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31Figure 7: Drug use by age group
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent condence intervals. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates generic
entry.
32Figure 8: Original molecule overall use specication checks
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Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent con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dard errors clustered at the therapeutic class and six month period. Vertical line indicates generic
entry.
33Figure 9: Reformulation use specication checks















































































-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
six month periods relative to generic entry
coefﬁcient estimates conﬁdence intervals

























































































-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
six month periods relative to generic entry
coefﬁcient estimates conﬁdence intervals













































































-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
six month periods relative to generic entry
coefﬁcient estimates conﬁdence intervals
Notes: Solid lines are coecient estimates, dashed lines are 95 percent con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34Figure 10: Metformin
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Notes: Vertical line indicates period (year for price, biannual for use, quarter for advertis-
ing) prior to generic entry for regular metformin in January 2002 . Price and utilization measures
constructed from the MEPS. Source of advertising data: IMS Health, IMS Promotion Audits,
1/1999-12/2008.
35Figure 11: Simvastatin
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Notes: Vertical line indicates period (year for price, biannual for use, quarter for advertising) prior
to generic entry for simvastatin in June 2006. Price and utilization measures constructed from the
MEPS. Source of advertising data: IMS Health, IMS Promotion Audits, 1/1999-12/2008.
36Figure 12: Bupropion SR and XL
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Notes: Vertical line indicates period (year for price, biannual for use, quarter for advertising) prior
to generic entry for buproprion SR in November 2003. Price and utilization measures constructed
from the MEPS. Source of advertising data: IMS Health, IMS Promotion Audits, 1/1999-12/2008.
37Figure 13: Citalopram
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Notes: Vertical line indicates period (year for price, biannual for use, quarter for advertising)
prior to generic entry for citalopram in October 2004. Price and utilization measures constructed
from the MEPS. Source of advertising data: IMS Health, IMS Promotion Audits, 1/1999-12/2008.
Missing total promotion data for 2001.
38A Data Construction
The main source of data for the analysis is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality. The MEPS consists of 11 overlapping two-year interview
panels. Each panel contains a nationally representative sample of around 16 thousand individuals
who are interviewed over the ve interview rounds across the two years. We calculate prices and
utilization probabilities using the MEPS Full Year Consolidated component les and the Prescribed
Medicines Component Files. The Full Year Consolidated le includes demographic and labor market
information, sample weights, and a rich set of round-specic health insurance coverage information.
The Prescribed Medicines component collects information from the actual pharmacies where survey
participants obtain their prescriptions. The information obtained from pharmacies includes the
national drug code and name of the drug, the strength and quantity obtained, the total price, as
well as the amounts paid by dierent insurance sources and the patient. The MEPS is able to
match only 50 percent of survey respondents prescription mentions to pharmacy information. The
MEPS imputes the information for non-matched drug mentions (Moeller et al. 2001). We only use
the matched prescriptions for our average price calculations, but we use all prescription mentions to
calculate utilization probabilities. Presumably, the imputations for the brand or generic status of
a drug is simpler and more accurate than imputed detailed price and insurance payer information.
The rst step for estimating utilization probabilities is to create patient-level indicator variables
for obtaining each drug molecule in a particular round. The Prescribed Medicines Component
includes the national drug code and the pharmacist provided drug name for each prescription
mention. The drug code is often missing, so we use the drug name to identify utilization. There
are occasional mistakes in drug names, such as a generic version of a drug molecule being obtained
before the FDA approved the generic version (i.e. uoxetine versus Prozac). We expect that this
reects the substitution of the molecule name for the brand name. Prior to generic entry we treat
these mentions as brand reports, but we are unable to distinguish between correct and incorrect
generic or brand reports following generic entry. Next, we convert the person-round drug indicator
variables to person-biannum drug indicator variables. While we do not know the exact date a
person obtains a drug, we know the start and end dates of each round for each person in the
sample. We assume that if an individual obtains a drug in a given round, they use the drug for
the entire round. Then, the person-biannum drug indicator is set to on for any biannual period
in which the round occurs. We treat the resulting person-biannum data set as repeated biannual
39cross-sections. Using the sample weights, we calculate the fraction of the population obtaining each
drug molecule in each biannum. The specic utilization outcomes we construct are the probability
of obtaining the branded version of a molecule in a given biannum, the probability of obtaining the
generic version of a molecule, the brand market share for each molecule, the overall probability of
obtaining a molecule (brand or generic), and the probability of obtaining a branded reformulation
of a molecule facing generic competition.
We are also interested in how changes in prescription drug utilization vary across individuals
with dierent prescription benet designs. Specically, we may expect that beneciaries with plans
that place more restrictions on obtaining branded drugs (such as HMOs or Medicaid) may be less
likely to switch to a new branded molecule following generic entry than patients with less restrictive
fee-for-service or PPO plans. Thus, we estimate utilization probabilities separately for individuals
with private HMO health plans, employer provided health insurance that is not from a HMO,
Medicaid recipients, and individuals aged 65 or older. We use monthly employer provided health
insurance and Medicaid variables in the MEPS Full Year Consolidated Files to determine whether
an individual had employer provided health insurance or Medicaid ever in a six-month period.
There are round-specic HMO variables from the Person Round Plan component that indicate
whether an individual had employer provided HMO coverage in each round. Thus, the non-HMO
employer coverage is dened as having employer coverage in a biannual period, but having no
HMO coverage during rounds that occurred during that biannual period. It should be noted that
individuals select into dierent types of health insurance. This non-random selection, as well as
dierences in prescription benet design, will drive dierences in utilization patterns across health
insurance types.
We also construct price outcome variables using the MEPS Prescribed Medicines component.
We calculate average prices only using prescription mentions that are matched to pharmacist re-
ports. We create a person-round data set that gives the average unit price (across dosages) paid
by each person who obtained a prescription in a given round. We convert the person-round le to
a person-biannum le by taking weighted averages of the person-round averages, with the weights
depending on the amount of a round that occurred in a given biannum. We use the person-biannum
data and sample weights to create average unit prices for each molecule in each biannum. For the
empirical work, we convert the nominal unit prices to real prices using year 2000 dollars, and then
convert prices to natural log units. Average out-of-pocket prices are zero for some observations.
40Thus, for all out-of-pocket and total price outcomes (in order to be consistent in each case), we
add one before taking the natural log.
Prices in the case study graphs are calculated annually and do not drop imputations. We did
this in part to compare aggregate expenditures with MEPS-generated aggregates. These prices
are calculated as total expenditures in each year divided by total units (i.e. pills) sold in each
year. These averages are slightly dierent, as they provide the average price of a prescription of a
given drug, as opposed to the average of within-person average prices, which is used in our price
regressions. Individuals with more prescriptions may nd cheaper prices, and will receive higher
weighting in the latter calculation. However, the average unit prices and patterns are qualitatively
calculated either way.
The specic price outcomes we construct include total branded price, out-of-pocket branded
price, total average price (across brand and generic molecules), average out-of-pocket price, and
nally total and out-of-pocket \lower-bound" prices. The lower bound price is equal to the average
branded price prior to generic entry and the average generic price following. We only observe
individuals selecting into branded and generic drugs. It may be that individuals who chose generic
drugs face higher brand prices, and individuals who choose branded drugs face lower co-payments
for generic drugs. Thus, our branded drug, and our \lower-bound" prices may not reect the
actual average total and out-of-pocket brand and generic prices facing beneciaries. However, the
average prices should accurately reect the average price faced by individuals acquiring these drugs
(aside from selection issues stemming from the non-matched individuals in the Prescribed Medicines
component).
We have generated total expenditures and total numbers of prescriptions to compare with
AHRQ- constructed aggregates for highly used drugs. We are typically within 1 to 2 percent of the
MEPS aggregates, these comparisons are available upon request.
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